World trade is not a topic that immediately springs to mind when discussing the 47 countries that make up sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, Africa has not held a particularly prominent role in this province during the past century. The World Trade Organisation (WTO), wanted to address this issue swiftly when it was formed in 1995. A deadline of 31st December 2007 was set for the abolition of pre-existing trade deals that did not match the WTO’s aims for open global markets, free from tariffs and restriction.
The European Union might not have realised, but the economic and political landscape of Africa has changed. African countries now scrutinise trade deals instead of blindly accepting agreements that might have some sort of ‘aid’ attached. Another concern for the EU is that it is facing a new competitor − one with huge ambitions.
When the EU introduced its new WTO-compliant Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), it probably expected African leaders to be signing up in droves. After all, was not the proposed reciprocal, duty-free market access what these countries wanted and needed? However, the deal offered to African leaders at the EU-Africa summit in Lisbon, in December 2007, was strongly rejected, with few countries signing up. Perhaps EU leaders hoped their African counterparts would be pressurised into signing up to the EPA to avoid having to pay heavy export duty come 1st January 2008. These bully tactics may have worked for the old colonial masters, but times have changed. African economies are progressing, and perhaps trade partners should be altering perspectives too.
A major criticism of the WTO is that its idea of ‘Free Trade’ does not take into account the economic levels or capacities of both rich developed countries and poorer developing  ones. In equivalent terms, the WTO wants heavyweights and flyweights to fight in the same boxing ring. Ultimately, the effects of globalisation cannot be ignored, nor easily reversed. WTO rulings carry a great deal of weight;  they can impose trade sanctions on countries which can overrule national government legislation.
One country in particular has focused its efforts in aligning its trade strategy to that of the WTO: China. The power of the reciprocity ruling, which requires equal treatment of both imported and nationally produced goods, has been recognised by the Chinese government. China has taken a proactive stance in forming trade partnerships, recognising that becoming a global economic power requires global trade partners. The EU, on the other hand, continues to use the non-reciprocal, preferential market access framework of the Lomé Convention of 1976 − regarded by some as an extension of old colonial trade ties. As the largest importer of African goods, it is not surprising that the EU assumed it would continue to be Africa’s number one trade partner. China’s forays into Africa are without question driven by its search for energy, particularly oil. However, China sees Africa as more than just a source of natural resources; it also notices an excellent potential market for its low-cost consumer goods.  It predicts an increase in the scope for foreign investment as more African countries privatise their industries. One such example is the Chinese textile industry that is investing in African factories to skirt around European and US export quotas.
Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing its strongest growth and lowest inflation in over 30 years. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted the African economy would continue to grow by over 6% in the next two years, buoyed by increased macro-economic stability, capital inflow and the commodities boom. China’s trade with Africa jumped by 39% in 2005 to US $32 billion and reached US $50 billion in 2006. Furthermore, in February and March 2007, the US imported more oil from sub-Saharan Africa than the Middle East. In the face of China’s new interest in the region, could the seemingly unthinkable happen and Europe, Africa’s largest trade partner, miss out on the latest battle for economic supremacy?
Europe needs a fundamental shift in its approach to African trade. Africa is still a very long way from being a major world trading power but in the words of President John Kufuor of Ghana, “Europe needs Africa as much as Africa needs Europe.” The emergence of China, with its “mutual non-interference in domestic affairs” policy, has introduced a trade partner that could replace Europe in the future.
EU leaders must begin to understand what Africans want and begin to see things from an African perspective. One major source of dissatisfaction amongst African leaders concerning the EPAs was the negotiation process itself. Talks were carried out in four regional groups − East African Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC), la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), and the Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) − reminiscent of the old imperialist divide-and-rule tactics of the 19th Century. This created regional tensions amongst leaders, undermining moves for political harmony and other African-led regional integration schemes; Tanzania is a member of both EAC and SADC for example. It also seems ludicrous that Lesotho and South Africa would have to negotiate the same EPA terms as part of the SADC, despite Lesotho having a GDP equivalent to about one percent of that of South Africa, the richest nation on the continent.
The EU then decided to change tack completely in an effort to get at least half of the sub-Saharan countries to sign up. Interim EPAs would allow duty- and quota-free access to EU markets, and gradual reduction of tariffs on EU products from 2010 over a ten-year period. These agreements were also offered to some countries individually, practically ending ongoing regional negotiations. Indeed, EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson’s public criticism of countries refusing to sign EPAs has come across as antagonistic, and has not done much to dispel the image of the EU pressurising individual countries into bilateral deals.
China’s presence in Africa is not entirely a welcome one. Its policy of “non-interference” may initially sound attractive, but in actual fact has more sinister implications. Under the auspices of this policy China has invested in Sudan, where it imports 64% of Sudan’s oil production in spite of the ongoing atrocities in Darfur. China justifies the use of force and even soldiers to protect its foreign assets, which include US$100m of Shenyang fighter planes, 12 supersonic F-7 jets and helicopter gunships that were sold to the Islamist government in Khartoum. Southern Darfur is rich in oil, currently untapped due to the unrest. As China’s hunger for oil increases this is unlikely to remain unexplored, which does not bode well for peace in the region. The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation already owns a concession there which is protected by armed Chinese soldiers.
Although some memories may be short, China is not the first and probably will not be the last country to sell arms to Africa.  Britain’s £1.7bn arms deal with South Africa in 1999 rings a bell. Indeed, France’s Defence Minister condemned China for flooding Africa with arms only months after France had sold £200m of weapons to Libya. In part, this is the problem that Europe faces. If Europe wishes to take the stance of the anti-arms, pro-democracy trade partner then it must do more to prove to Africans that this is the case. Refusal to comment on the displacements and mass murders in Darfur, or the state of Zimbabwe, is not too dissimilar to China’s non-intervention policy. Once again the opportunity to seize the moral high-ground was lost by EU leaders at the Lisbon summit. Section 8.2 of the action plan details the aim “to strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights;” whether that was achieved is doubtful.
Chinese influence in Africa has not all been negative. China has listened to what the people want and need and have responded. The TANZAM railway from Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania to Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia, was built and financed by China between 1970 and 1975. The project was to provide an alternative trade route and end landlocked Zambia’s reliance on South Africa and Rhodesia. Thirty years later China has returned and is still building infrastructure: roads, bridges and dams, in addition to schools, hospitals and fibre-optic networks, whilst also providing training.
Although these projects are contracted to Chinese firms, they have been welcomed as the projects have been low-cost, good quality and completed in a fraction of the time it normally takes in Africa. European countries used to carry out similar projects, but at some point they were halted, perhaps deemed unfashionable. Yet the lack of infrastructure really cripples trade in Africa. Many landlocked countries do not have adequate roads that reach the borders of a neighbouring sea-facing country. This means reliance on air freight, which drives up costs, not to mention the environmental impact. In order to become a serious trading partner, Africa needs infrastructure. By following China’s current lead, perhaps Europe can regain favour or ‘buy goodwill’, as China is doing.
Perhaps fears that EU countries will flood African markets are unfounded. The effect may even be smaller than the predicted influx of Chinese goods. In this respect African countries should do more to add value to raw materials instead of hoping preferential trade agreements are enough to keep economies ticking over. Africa is still plagued by poor governance across the continent − the slump in oil production in April 2007 and onwards was attributed to disturbances in the Niger delta. The predicted growth by the IMF does not reflect the true size and potential of sub-Saharan Africa when it is considered that large countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Zimbabwe, with abundant natural resources, have had economic growth stifled by political and civil unrest. Like it or not, China’s presence in Africa has opened a new chapter in African trade.
Fifty years after gaining independence, many African states are finding that they have more power when negotiating trade deals; they will not be bullied by international organisations or immediately accept what is offered on the negotiation table, no questions asked. African people are regaining their voice, and European leaders need to listen carefully. The EU needs a bold shift in policy if it is to entice African countries away from trading with China as the world moves closer to truly free trade.